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FERRONJ V. PACIFIC FINANCE CORP.

[21 C.2d

not answerable under sectionA02 of the VehiCle vode .for the
negligent operation of the vehicle by the conditional v.e~dee.,
That follows from the basis of the liability of the condItIonal
vendor under that seQtion.He is liable, and does not fall
within the exclusion provision thereof when he fails to comply
with section 177 of the Vehicle Code requiring notice of
transfer of the car. That section states that when the owner
of a vehicle sells title or interest in the vehicle and deUvers
possession thereof, the department must be .notified im~e
diately. Qrdinarily the condition,al vendor delIvers posseSSIOn
of the car to the ven.dee, but the assignee does not, When the
assignment is made, delivery of possession to the conditional
vendee' has already, been completed.
[7] It follows from the foregoing that the judgment must
be reversed insofar as it determines that appellant is liable as
thE; owner of the car. The court also found that the partnership was not the owner and therefore not liable. As we have
seen that determination is supported by sufficient evidence.
Plainti:lis have appealed from that portion of the judgment.
Inasinuchas a retrial of the issue of ownership as to appellant
alone might res~lt in a determination that appellant was not
the owner" hence, leaving plainti:lis in the position, where
neither the partnership nor appellant was the owner, and hence
not liable as such, the judgment in favor of the, partnership
is alSo reversed.' Otherwise, there would be inconsistent judgments on the same facts, because' if appellant was merely acting as the partnership's agent and thus not liable, then, the,
partnership would necessarily be the owner, and therefore
liable. Such inconsistent, jUdgments will not be permitted
to stand. (See SouthernPacijic 00. v. Oity of Los A.ngeles,
5 Ca1.2d 545 [55 P .2d 847] ~) From the circumstances pre'sented, either the appellant or the partnership was the owner
within the scope of section 402 of,the Vehicle Code. On retrial
that issue should be resolved 'upon the introduction of proper
evidence.
'
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed both
as to appellant 'and the partnership, and the cause remanded
for anew trial to determine the sole issslie of ownership of the
car at the time of,the accident, and thereupon fix liability upon
the owner pursuant to secti()n 402 of the Vehicle Code for
the damages sU:IIered byplainti:lis.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor,
J., and Griffin, J. pro tem., concurred.

1/

'\-l.>

6"182. -'373
Apr; 1943]

•

SUTTER-YUBA iNVEST.

[Sac. No. 5586. In Bank.

•
Co. v. WASTE

•

181

Apr. 7, 1943.]

SUTTER-YUBA INVESTMENT COMPANY ('.aCorporation), Petitioner, v. HELEN WASTE, as County Auditor, etc., Respondent.
[1] Taxation-Sale-Redemption-Amount Required.-:-Under PoL
Code, § 817, to redeem from county tax delinquency property
purchased from a reclamation district, :the purchaser must
pay not only the delinquent county taxes due before the district became the owner, but also ,an amount equivalent to,
taxes for all the years it was unassessed because it was' owned
by the district. The rule applies even though taxes were
erroneously assessed for such years and were cancelled be-,.
cause ,of such ownership.
' -

[2] Id. - Sale-Redemption-Amount Required-Statuto17 Oonstruction.-In Pol. Code, § 3817, the" provision reqUiring one
redeeming property sold to the state fortaXlls to, pay "'if,' not
••. assessed, ... upon the value of the, propertj";referfJto
property legally unassessed.
" "
[3] Id.-Sale-:-Redemption.:.-Amollnt Required-:-Oonstituttona1ity:

..:....Const., art. XIII, § 1, is not violated, by Pol. Code, §3817,
reqrdring ,one redeeming property deeded to the stateor,other '
taxing unit, such as a reclamation district,'to, pay)~esfor
the unassessedyears. The exemption of the taxingunitdoes
not enable the, redemptioner to obtain title' fr~efronl:theeon
ditions or for less than the price the state has set.',

PROCEEDING 'in ,mandamus to' compel computationol
amount necessary to redeem property from tax delinquency.
Writ denied. '
,",
,.
Rich & ,Weis for Petitioner.
Thomas, C. Boone, A. L. Cowell, Hankins & Hankins, Ron~
'ald l B. Harris, Harry W. Horton, W. H: Jennings,C.F.
Me~teer, P. J. Minasian" Maurice M. Myers andAivin B."
'Shaw, Jr., as Amici Curiae on ,behalf of Petitioner.
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 339.
McK. Dig., Reference: [1-3] Taxation, §335.

i
I

782

SUTTER-YUBA INVEST.

COf V.

•

WASTE

[21 C.2d

Apr. 1943]

SUTTER-YUBA INVEST.
[21 0.24 '181]

Co. v.
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,

I

Earl Warren, Attorne! General, .~obert W. Kenny, Attorney General, H. H. Lmney, Assl~tant Attorney Gentral,
Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attorneyl General,Joseph L. Heenan, District Attorney (Yuba Cou~~y), and Arthur S. Powell, Deputy District Attorney, for Rjespondent.
Elmer W. Heald, District AttornJ (Imperial), and Lowell
L. Sparks, District Attorney (Placjr), as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Assessments levied Upon certain real property by Reclamation District No. 784 were not paid, and on
June 15, 1932, the property was sold to the Yuba County Treasurer as trustee for the bond fund of the district. The property' was not redeemed within the time allowed by law, and.
on February 3, 1938, the county treasurer executed and recorded a deed thereof to himself as trustee for the district.
The second installment of county taxes for 1937-1938 was
then delinquent. County taxes for the years 1938, 1939, and
1940 were erroneously assessed but were subsequently cancelled, leaving only the second installment of the 1937-1938
· tax as a lien against the property. The district sold its title
to the property, and on October 15, 1940, delivered a deed
· to the petitioner, who requested respondent to prepare an
estimate of the amount necessary toredeeril the property from
county tax delinquency. The estimate prepared by respondent included an amount representing the taxes that would
have been levied during the years the property was owned
by the district. Respondent refused to make an estimate
· representing only the second installment of the tax fo~ ~9371938 with penalties and interest thereon, and petItIOner
brought this proceeding in mandamus to compel her to do so.
Petitioner contends that since the county cannot tax the
property of a reclamation district (Cal. Const., art. XIII,
sec. 1; Rev. & Tax. Code, sec. 4986; Laguna Beach Oounty
Water District v. Orange Oounty, 30 Cal.App.2d 740 [87
P.2d 46] ; Anderson-Oottonwood Irrigation District v. Klukkert, 13 Ca1.2d ·191 [88 P.2d 685J; Glenn-Oolusa Irrigation District v. Ohrt, 31 Cal.App.2d 619 [88 P.2d 763])
the purchaser of any such property who wishes to redeem

..

,

the property for delinquent county tax~s levied .beforeth~
deed to tlie county treasurer cannot be required to ,pat~
part of the amount necessary to redeem a sum equal to tlJl
taxes that would otherwise have been imposed for the ye.a~
that the property was owned by the ?istrict. . . . .. ,,';;
The amounts payable on redemptIon of the property ~re
governed by Political Code section 3817 as it read· in .1938
wheI!l. the property was sold to the state for the nOnpayment
of the second installment of county taxes for 1937-1938.
Under this section the owner of the property, "hisheini,
executors, administrators or other successors in interest shall"
at any time after the same has been sold to the State arid
before the State shall have disposed of the same, have .the
right to redeem such real estate by paYing to the county;
treasurer of the county wherein the real estate may be sit;.
uated, the amount of taxes, penalties for delinquency, and
costs due thereon at the time of such sale, and also taxes that
were a lien upon said real property at the time said taxes
became delinquent; and also all unpaid taxes of every de:scription which are a lien against the property, foreac~
year since the sale, as shown on the delinquent assessment
rolls in the then. permanent custody of the county auditor?
or if not so assessed, then upon the value of the property as
fixed by the assessor under section 3817m. • . ." (Italics
added.)
"The county auditor shall, on the application of the person
desiring to redeem, make an estimate of the amount to be
paid, and shall give him triplicate certificates of the amount,
specifying the several amounts thereof, ... " (Stats. 1937,
p.144.)
Section 3817m, referred to in section 3817, provid,ed;
"Whenever property is being redeemed or delinquent taxell
are being paid in installments on property and it does not
appear on the assessment roll, the county auditor shalI furnish the county assessor with a list of the years for. whic~
no assessment has been made arid the assessor shall place
a valuation on the property which the auditor shall use in
computing the tax for the years when the property was not
assessed." (Stats. 1937, p. 150.)
[1] It is thus clearly provided that an· amount equivalent to taxes for the unassessed years must be included iI;l
.an estimate of redemption. Virtually the only property legally
,unassessed that is subject to redemption is property that has

.\

~
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.been deeded to the State or other taxing units for the nonpayment of taxes and assessments. Thus, under Political
Code section 3813, property that has been sold to the state
"shall be assessed each subsequent year for taxes until a deed
is made to the state therefor." Nonassessment after. deed to
the state or other taxing unit results from the tax exemption of government owned property under article XIII, section 1 of the California Constitution. [2] Section 3817
refers. to property that is legally unassessed; property that
has illegally escaped assessment is governed by Political
Code sections 3660-3662, authorizing an action against· the
assessor and the sureties on his official b()nds for an .intentional omission of property from the assessment roll, and by
Political Code section 3649, providing for the assessment
and taxation of property in the year succeeding that in which
it escapes assessment.
In the case of property that is delinquent but not deeded
to any taxing unit, the auditor ascertains the delinquent
taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, and the property may be
redeemed upon the payment of these amounts to the county
treasurer. If 'the property has been deeded to the state or
other taxing unit and is therefore unassessed, the auditor
not only ascertains the amount due on the assessment roll
but computes' an amount equivalent to the taxes for the un~
assessed years upon a valuation of the property by the as~
sessor under Political Code section 3817m. The total of the
two amounts is the sum required by section 3817 to redeem
the property. This procedure has governed the redemption
of property in this state since 1895. (Stats. 1895, p. 22, 333·
now embodied iriRevenue and Taxation Code
. , sections 4101:
4113.) Its validity was sustained in Andreson Co. v. Los
Angeles County, 55 Cal.App. 585 [203 P.I040], holding that
while the property there involved was un assessed by virtue
of having been deeded to the State, the redemption charges
under Political Code section 3817.included· an amount representing taxes that would have been levied upon the property for the years subsequent to the date of the deed, Section 3817 makes no exception for property deeded to a
recla~ation district. The immunity of such property from
taxatIOn does not preclude, any more than the immunity of
property deeded to the state, the imposition of such conditions to redemptions as the state deems advisable.
[3] The contention that the condition in question violates
article XIII, section 1 of the California Constitution, i '""norb3

the distinction between the rlg:Q.t of a taxmgagency to exemption from taxation on its property and the right of, a'
former owner' or his successor in interest to redeem that property f,rom the lien of another taxing ·agency. The exemption
of the taxing unit does not enable the redemptioner to obtain'
title to the property free from the conditions and for less,
than. the price that the State sets. (Griggs V" Hartzoke,13
CaLAplr. 429, 434 [109P. 1104]; Lachrriund V" Johnson, 47
Cal.App.2d 377 [117 P.2d920].) As this court stated in Palo-'
mares Land Co. v. Los Angeles Cottnty, 146 Cal. 530 [80 P.
931], at 533, "the provisions of the law authorizing redemp~
tion (Pol. Code, sec. 3817) are to be regarded simplyas,an
offer by the state to release its claims to the land sold upon
the terms proposed." There'is no constitutional right to redeem property that has been sold to the state for the nonpayment of taxes. "The right Of redemption comes. entirely
from the statute, and is subject to all the limitations and conditionstherein imposed." (Quinn v. Kenny, 47 Cal. i47.)
In the interest of returning tax delinquent property to the
tax rolls, the State has enacted liberal provisions for the
redemption of such property, so designed as to discourage
tax avoidance. If they did not require that redemption take
into account the taxes that would be imposed had the property not been deeded to the state, owners would find it advantageoUs to allow their property to 'be deeded to the state
with the. intention of· delaying redemption as long as possible
to escape the taxes that attend ownership, secure in the knowledge that the state must givetliem notice before disposing
of the property. (PoL Code, secs. 3833~3834.25.) The right
of redemption until the disposal of the property by the state
serves the taxpayer's convenience but does not enable him
escape taxes for the period intervening between the deed to
,the state and redemption while others pay' their taxes con,
scientiously year by year. Likewise he cannot escape~uch, .
taxes, by allowing his property to be deeded to .. any other.'
taxing unit'· such as ·.a reclamation district· and sub~eqlIently,
regaining the tjtle free of intervening taxes. Section, 3!317
forestalls any possibility that intermittent ownership would,
become more advantageous than continuous ownership; .Ai
the same time it.imposes no burden on the taxing' Unit, which
can obtain the property free of the tax lien by negotiation
with the county board of supervisors under the provisionsoi
section 3791 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
•. (South San.
.

to

)
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Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2Ca1.2d 485 [42
P.2d 64].)
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Griffin, J., pro tem, concurred.
CARTER, J.-:-I dissent. The effect. of the construction
placed upon section 3817 of the Political Code by the· majority opinion is to destroy the exemption granted to irrigation. and reclamation districts from assessment and taxation
of property owned by such districts by section 1. of article.
XIII of the Constitution of California, and renders· such
statute unconstitutional.
The facta in the case are simple. Land which was subject
to taxation by both Yuba: County and Reclamation District
No. 78-;1:, was sold by the district for delinquent assessments.
No redemption having been made from that sale the property
was deeded to the district on February 3, 1!)38, all right of
redemption being thereby cut off. When the deed. was executed the second installment of 1937-1938 county taxes was
a lien upon the property and was delinquent. In 1940, petitioner purchased the property from the district. During the
years 1938, 1939 and 1940, while the district was the owner
of the property, county taxes were assessed against the property, but before petitioner's purchase of the property said
taxes were cancelled by the board of supervisors because the
property was not subject to taxation by the county while
owned by the district, a state agency. (Cal. Const., art. XIII,
sec. 1; Anderson-OottonwoodIrr. Dist. v. Klukkert, 13 Cal.
2d191 [88 P.2d 685],) The majority opinion holds that in
order for petitioner to redeem the property" from the delinquent county taxes whicbwere due prior to the time the district became the owner oithe property, it must pay not only
those delinquent taxes, but also all taxes which might be said·
to have accrued during the time the district was the owner.
That conclusion is based upon an interpretation of section
3817 of the Political Code dealing with redemption. Said
section provides that property may be redeemed from county
taxes. by payment of taxes due when sold to the state "and
also all taxes that were a lien upon said .. ~ property at the.
time said taxes became delinquent; and also ·all unpaid taxes
of every description which are a lien against the property,
for each year since the sale, as shown on the delinquent as~
sessment rolls in the then permanent custody of the county

Apr. 1943]
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auditor' or ij not so assessed, then upon the value of tks·

propert~ a:jixed by the assessor under section 3817m..

?'

In my opinion that provision is not ;ea.sonab~y. susceptIble of
the interpretation given it by the maJonty oplDlon for several
reasons.'
,
; . f
'
The taxes for the years the district was the owner 0.' the
property were not a .lien upon it because, alt?ough ass~sedj
they were cancelled by the board ·of 'superv1s~rs. TheY,arl;l
not the taxes to be computed on the value to be futed· by the
assessor under the last sentence of the code provision beca.use
that sentence is operative only if the property was. not ~.
sessed. In the instant case it was assessed and' a tax leVIed
thereon which became delinquent on the assessment rolls, hut.
was later cancelled. This view is further made clear by sec~
tion 3817m of the Political Code which .states that the as~
sessor shall fb: the valuation upon which. the tax shall be
computed . when property is being redeemed only. if the
property does not appear on the assess~ent roll and no' a.s~
sessment has been made. Hence, there 18 no requirementm
section 3817 that the taxes which would have accrued while
the district was the owner, but which did not accrue because
of its ownershIp, must be paid by a redemptioner who is 8
purchaser from the district
.
.
The .amounts that must be paId by a redemptIoner under
section 3817 are taxes, not penalties or the like. They are so
referred'· to in that section. 1n section 3817m the' computation when no assessment has been made is of the "tax for the
years when the property was not assessed." Sec~ion 3813
providing for the continuation of assessments after a deed to
the state calls for the assessment of taxes.' Therefore, the
amou.nts payable under section 3817· are taxes. As no taxes
could be assessed while the district was the owner, no taxes
may be collected fl'om the purchaser who pUrchased the property from the district.
The whole purpose of the constitutional exemption from
taxation of state owned property will be thwarted if the con'struction placed upon section 3817 by the majority· opinion
'prevails. The district never will be able to .disp~se of property
acquired by it for delinquent assessments. It 18 ObVIOUS that
the district does not desire to retain such property, its main
concern being to put it back on the assessment rolls. If 8
purchaser from the district must pay county taxes for the
period the district held it, it is doubtful if a purchaser will
be found, and the benefits flowing to the district from the

.,'-.

:
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'~xemption will be wholly lost.' The sa~e situation would, eXIst
,if property acquired by a veteran and thereafter claimed to
be exempt from taxation while owned by him (Constitution,
article XIII, section 114), were sold subject to a delinquent
tax installment which accrued before he acquired title. Should
the purchaser attempt to redeem the property from the delin~
quency" he woUld be forced to pay taxes which would have
accrued while the title stood in the veteran's name, but which
were not paid because of his constitutional exemption. Likewise, should a person convey property to the ,state or to one
of its agencies for some specific public use upon condition that
it would revert to him if and when the public ceased using
'it for such .purpose, and it thereafter reverted to him and it
became necessary for him to redeem such property trom a
tax delinquency which accrued prior to the conveyance to
the public agenCly, he would be required to pay all taxes which
might have accrued had the property remained in private
ownership \vhile it was owned and used by the public, notwithstanding the fact that said property was exempt from
assessment or taxation and was not assessed during the time
that it was owned alid used by the public agency.
It is obvious that the reclamation district could have paid
the second installment of 1937-1938 county taxes or redeemed
,the property from the delinquent tax sale which resulted from
the failure to pay such installment, and in such event the
purchaser from the district would not have been required to
redeem. It ,must be conceded that had this procedure been
followed neither the district nor the purchaser would have
had to pay any taxes on this property while title thereto was
held by the district as no redemption would have been required, and the property could 'not be assessed until title
vested in the purchaser from the district.
It seems highly improbable that the Legislature intended
that section 3817 of the ;Political Code should be construed as
requiring the payment· of taxes on property during the time,
,that it is expressly declared by the Constitution to be exempt
from taxation in order to redeem such property from a delinquent· tax sale based upon an installment of taxes which had
accrued prior to the time the property became exempt ,from
taxation. It is well settled that in construing a statute the
,.court must look at the context, and.theresult that would follow in order to arrive at the legislative intent. (Stockton
School District v. Wright, 134 Cal. 64 [66 P. 34] ; Marshallv.
Footel 81'Cal.App. 98 [252 P.I075]:)
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. j~th~ ease of People v. Davenport, i3Cal.2d68t,[91. P;2d

$92J, this' court held that the ,words ofa:st~tute' Will not be'
,gIven their literal meaning when to do so would carry' its
, operatlonfar beyond l~gislative.intent and, thereby, make'it
.apply· to transactioIis not contemplated by the' Legislature. '
As stated by Chief Justice Stone oftlie Supreme Court
of the :United States in United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354,
357 [46 S.Ct. 513, 70 L.Ed. 986] :
,
"All laws are to be given a sensible construction; and
.a literal application o:f a statute, which would lead to absurd,
consequences, should be avoided whenever a reasonable appli..
cation can be given to it, consistent with the iegi~lativei>ur~ ,
pose. " tn making this statement the Chief Justice'was!iot
announcing an unorthodox or unconventional doctrine: ,IpAmerican Tobacco 00. v. Werckmeister, 207'tJ~S. 284, 293
[28S,Ct, 72, 52 .L.Ed. 208], Mr. Justice Day said:
«But in construing a statute we are not always confiI.led
to a literal reading, and may consider its object and purpose,
the things with which it is dealing, and the condition' of
affairs which led to its enactment so as' to effectuate rather
than destroy the spirit and force of the law which the Legis~,
lature intended to enact.
'
,"It is true, and the plaintiff in error cites authoriti~s ',to
the' proposition, that where' the words o:f an .act are~lear and,
unambiguous they will control. But while seeking· to gain, the
legisla#ve intent primarily from the language used we must'
remember the objects and purposes sought to be attained.';
This court has repeatedly held that statut~s are to be
interpreted in the light of reason and COlliID.onsense and
should not be given a construction which will lead to absurd
consequences. (Great Western Distillery Products, Jn~.V;
John A: Wathen Distillery 00., 10 Ca1.2d 44"2 [74 P.2d
745] ; People v. Mulholland, 16 Cal.2d 62 [104P.2.q,1045];
People v. Ventu,ra Refining Oo~, 204 CaL 286 [268 p~ 347, '283
P. 60]; Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270 [248~. 91.7]; Bob~iai/'o Vo Bovet, 218 Cal. 589 [24 P.2d 466] ; 23 Cal.Jm:. 7'35.)
So, may it not be said that in the case at bar we' should:
look beyond the literal terms of the statute' to the PurPO!ie ,andi' '
object of the Legislature in enacting section 3817 of the Political CodeY It is obvious that ,the Legislature did notJiiterid:
directly or indirectly to destroy a constitutionllJ.' exemption.
against assessment and taxation o£property held ,by 'i publlc ,
agencies. A statute should never be so coruitrued'as'tonUllffY

'.
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a constitutional provision. (Rose v. State of Oalifornia, 19
Ca1.2d 713 [123 P .2d 505].) What it intended was to require

a redemptioner to pay taxes on property redeemed where the
taxes were not assessed because title was vested in the state
as the result of a sale to the state for' delinquent taxes, Such
property is not ina strict sense exempt from taxation,. but its
assessment for the purpose of taxation is suspended during
the time that title is held by the state as the repository of
titles'· derived from delinquent tax sales.
In my opinion, the exemption provided for in the Constitution is of a permanent nature and if property is once exempted aildno taxes are assessed against it because of such
exemption, it cannot thereafter be assessed for the same period
it was declared to be exempt by the Constitution. Therefore,
if the property in question was exempt from taxation while
the title thereto was vested in the reclamation diStrict; it did
not become subject to taxation during that period after title
thereto was acquired by petitioner, and petitioner is therefore
entitled' to the writ prayed for.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing, was denied May 6,
1943. Shenk, J., Carter, J., a.nd Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.

[~. F. No. 16609.

In Bank. Apr. 7,1943.J

JOHN FRANKLIN DARE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et a!.., Respondents.
[~]

Certiorari - Acts Reviewable - Acts' of Nongovernmental

Boards.~Certiorari is not an appropriate method . of review-

ing the action of a board not exercising judicial functions. .
[2] Administrative Law-Mandamus.-A citizen feeling aggrieved
because the action of an administrative board not exercising
. McK. Dig. References: [1] Certiorari, § 45; [2,3, 5-11] Administrativ.e Law; [4J Mandamus, § 2; [12, 13] Physicians and Surgeons, § 19.

OF

MEDICAL EXAMINERS

[21 C.2d790]' .

judicial functions will have the effect of depriving hiniof a
constitutional right may have the action reviewed in a mandamus proceeding, wherein the court, not being confined to
the record before the board,. may exercise an independent
judgment on all evidence before it.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Mandamus-TrialDe Novo-:-Evidence-Record of '
Evidence..,-In a mandamus proceeding to review the action
.of an administrative board, the record of the evidence before
the board is competent and should be considered with other
evidence in the cause.. If the respondent dOes: not include
the record as part of its return to the alternative writ, he
should have it available at the trial. If the petitioner prevailing in the case had to produce it at his own expense, he
·may recover therefor by way of damages pursuant to Code
. Civ.Proc., § 1095.
'
[4] M~ndamus-Nature.-Equitable principles are applicable in
a mandamus proceeding.
[5] Administrative Law'-:Mandamus--Trial De Nov~Nature.~·
In Ii mandam~s proceeding to review the' action' of an, adnii~
istrative board, the trial de novo is· not· unqualified orunlimited like that .oh appeal from a jilstice's court,' and. is not
governed by the rules .applicable to the review ofthe._action
of the Board of Governors of The State Bar. But the trial
is governed by Code' Civ.. Proc., §§ t084-1097. •
.
,[6a, 61>] Id--:--Mandamus~Trial DeNovo--Scope.-O~e charged'
. with violating the provisions of' his professional license may
not remain silent before the administrative board, or present
a so-called "skeleton" showing, and thereafter secure in court
a trilil de novo in an unlimited sense.
[7] Id.-Mandamus-Trial De NQvo-Evidence-Evidence Before
Board.-In a mandamus proceeding to rl:1view the action of 'an:
administrative board, it is not contemplated that there be a
reiteration of the' evidence presented to the board and' con.
tained in its record.
[8] Id.-Mandamus-Trial. De Novo-Evidence.-In a mandamus

proceeding to review the action of anadniinistrative board,
the complaining party may object'to incompetent evidence received by the board arid offer evidence improperly excluded.
And additional evidence may'·be received on a showing that".
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it co'!!1d not have been
introduced before the board.
[9] Id.-Mandamus-Trial De Novo-Witnesses-Impeachment.In a mandamus proceeding to review the action of an adinin-

[5] See 42 Am.Jur. 662.

